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]abs[In this paper, I explore a prognostic modality of environmental politics I 
call risk in retrospect. I do so by examining conflicts that are not just over the 
ability of state science to know and govern the future, but also its failure to 
have been able to do so in the past. I begin by discussing the 2009 earthquake 
that hit the Italian city of L’Aquila and then turn to a similar case in Colombia, 
both of which reflect the constitutive relationship between political authority 
and foresight. I then trace the strong historical precedent for this type of 
political situation in Colombia by discussing a key cultural referent – Gabriel 
García Márquez’s 1981 book, Chronicle of a death foretold – as well as the 
convergence of two catastrophic events during one week in November 1985 
that were both seen, in their aftermath, as ‘tragedies foretold’. I conclude by 
considering what it would mean for prognosis to become the terrain on which 
citizens engage in political relationships with the state. 
 
 1 
]p[This paper about Colombia begins in Italy, for Italy is home to a recent 
example of the prognostic tense of environmental politics. The situation I refer 
to is the 2009 earthquake that hit the Italian city of L’Aquila and the judicial 
decision handed down in 2012 to convict six scientists and one government 
official of manslaughter. They were guilty, the court ruled, of failing to give 
adequate warning to residents about the risk of an impending disaster – or, to 
paraphrase some of the more sensationalist media headlines, of not being able 
to predict the future. This case is significant not only because it may have far-
reaching consequences for the politics of disaster risk management or because 
it raises so many questions about the relationship between technical expertise, 
political authority, and legal accountability. It is also worth mentioning here 
for its ability to highlight the peculiar temporality of conflicts over the state’s 
responsibility to know and govern the future, and its failure to have been able 
to do so in the past. In other words, it reflects a prognostic modality of 
environmental politics we might call risk in retrospect. 
]p1[In early 2009, a series of small tremors was felt across the Abruzzo 
region east of Rome. The public’s unease was heightened when a retired local 
laboratory technician began issuing unofficial predictions, based on homemade 
monitoring devices, that a major earthquake was imminent. The national risk 
commission then met in the city of L’Aquila on 31 March to evaluate the 
situation, concluding that the recent swarm of seismic activity only slightly 
increased the probability of a major event. In a press conference, a government 
spokesman communicated that there was no danger and that it was 
unnecessary to issue safety warnings or order evacuations. A week later, a 6.3 
magnitude quake devastated the city, killing 309 people. Seven members of the 
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risk commission were eventually taken to court by lawyers representing the 
victims’ families. In support of the seismologists and geologists standing trial, 
an international coalition of more than 5,000 scientists issued an open letter to 
President Giorgio Napolitano. Their letter highlighted the scientific consensus 
that seismologists cannot predict when and where an earthquake will occur, 
and argued that the defendants were being prosecuted for failing to do the 
impossible. This was the primary argument put forth by the defence. But on 22 
October 2012, the prosecution prevailed. Judge Marco Billi ruled that the 
defendants had communicated ‘inexact, incomplete, and contradictory’ 
information about the risk of a major earthquake; that they had lulled the 
public into a false sense of security with a deceptively reassuring statement; 
and that they had failed to give clear preparedness advice. The verdict: all 
seven were sentenced to six years in prison and ordered to pay over $10 
million for court costs and damages. 
 
]p1[Around the time of this ruling, Colombia was suffering from one of 
the worst rainy seasons on record. Amidst the deluge, President Juan Manuel 
Santos presided over the twenty-fifth anniversary of another catastrophic 
event: a volcanic eruption in 1985 that set off massive mudslides and buried 
the town of Armero, killing nearly 30,000 people. In his commemorative 
address, he urged Colombians to apply lessons learned from the earlier disaster 
to the current one in order to avoid falling into ‘victim syndrome’ (síndrome 
del damnificado).
1
 Santos encouraged those affected by the recent storms to 
adopt ‘an attitude of mutual collaboration and solidarity’ and to emulate the 
patience and perseverance of the 13-year-old girl, Omayra Sánchez, whose 
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tragic death had come to symbolize the calamity. Moreover, he signalled that 
‘among the lessons this great tragedy left behind is the importance of foresight 
and doing everything possible to prevent tragedies’. In the case of Armero, he 
recalled, ‘it may have been possible to avoid many of the deaths … this is an 
important lesson … if only the warnings had been heard’. Santos reminded his 
audience that the 1985 event had given birth to Colombia’s national system of 
disaster prevention, which had since saved thousands of lives. His comments 
demonstrated the degree to which the Armero tragedy continues to underpin 
the state’s political, legal, and ethical responsibility to anticipate and prevent 
potentially catastrophic events. 
]p1[The Italian and Colombian cases both sit within the domain of 
prognostic politics, the topic of this special issue, which draws our attention to 
the calculative techniques used to predict environmental futures, and to the 
political significance of such predictions. However, this paper focuses on 
natural disasters rather than natural resources – social bads rather than social 
goods. Yet the temporal dynamic it highlights might be as common to debates 
over declining water supplies as to those regarding rising sea levels. For 
attempts to grasp both resource availability and environmental risk rely on 
techniques for calculating the likelihood of different futures, and then bringing 
them into the realm of individual or collective decision-making. Despite a wide 
range of techniques of prediction and degrees of predictability, both resources 
and disasters are situated in a common technocratic domain, within which 
political authority is linked to the state’s responsibility to generate knowledge 
about the future and to govern accordingly.
2
 As Reinhart Koselleck (2004) has 
argued, (rational) prognosis displaced (religious) prophecy as the paradigmatic 
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conception of futurity in the modern period along with the secularization of 
political authority. That said, the L’Aquila disaster in Italy and the Armero 
tragedy in Colombia suggest that prognostic politics is not solely about the 
future, but often also about the past. Both cases illustrate a peculiar temporality 
– at once prospective and retrospective – that often characterizes public 
controversies in the aftermath of catastrophe. 
]p1[The following analysis builds on long-term fieldwork in Colombia 
to illuminate a prognostic modality of environmental politics: risk in 
retrospect. Over a twenty-month period from August 2008 to April 2010, I 
conducted both ethnographic and archival research in Bogotá on the 
emergence of disaster risk management as a technique of urban planning and 
government (Zeiderman 2012; 2013). My specific focus was a municipal 
housing programme actively relocating people from what in the early 2000s 
had been designated zonas de alto riesgo, or ‘zones of high risk’. These were 
areas on the periphery of the city deemed vulnerable to landslides and, in some 
cases, also to floods. I returned for a one-month follow-up visit in January 
2012, towards the end of what would eventually amount to over a year of 
inordinately heavy rainfall, to find areas near my fieldsites recovering from 
extensive inundation. I was interested in the government’s response to the 
flooding as well as that of the people whose homes had been damaged by it, 
and made a series of visit to the affected areas. These neighbourhoods were 
outside my initial study area, so I had to rely on chance encounters with local 
residents who responded to my inquiries, invited me into their homes, and 
agreed to be interviewed. In order to reconstruct the events leading up to the 
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floods, I supplemented interview data by consulting media coverage from 
December 2010 to February 2012.
3
 
]p1[In what follows, I draw on this material to examine conflicts over 
the ability of state science to know and govern environmental futures and its 
failure to have done so in the past. I begin by considering differing approaches 
to the politics of temporality, especially in relation to a paradigmatic spatial 
configuration – the city – in which prognosis has become a key idiom of 
political authority and responsibility. Having introduced the problematic of 
risk in retrospect by way of the 2009 earthquake that hit the Italian city of 
L’Aquila, I then turn to a more fine-grained analysis of a similar case in 
Colombia that transpired during and after the worst rainy season in recorded 
history. I trace the historical precedent for this type of situation in Colombia by 
discussing a key cultural referent – Gabriel García Márquez’s 1981 book, 
Chronicle of a death foretold – as well as the convergence of two catastrophic 
events during one week in November 1985 that were both seen, in their 
aftermath, as ‘tragedies foretold’. I conclude by considering what it would 
mean for prognosis to become the terrain on which citizens, especially the 
poor, engage in political relationships with the state. Ultimately, I argue that if 
political authority is increasingly tied to the ability to generate knowledge 
about the future – of resources, of disasters, and of many other social and 
environmental goods and bads – our capacity to understand the strategic 
potential of prognosis is of pre-eminent importance. 
 
]ha[The politics of temporality in the city 
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]p[The L’Aquila disaster in Italy and the Armero tragedy in Colombia both 
point to a peculiar yet widespread modality of environmental politics that is at 
once prospective and retrospective. This observation is inspired by historian of 
science and technology Paul Edwards (2012a), who has argued that the extent 
of two recent disasters – the Fukushima nuclear fallout and the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill – could not be known except through already-existing 
computer simulations that could generate predictions of what was likely to 
happen in these sorts of events. That is, since tracking the real-time spread of 
these actual disasters was impossible, models designed previously to simulate 
the potential release of toxic substances (radiation and oil) into the surrounding 
environment became the authoritative record of what was happening (cf. 
Edwards 2012a). In other work, Edwards (2010) has shown how the science of 
global warming also relies on computer models and simulations, and that 
without them there are no data with which to predict how the world’s climate 
is likely to change. In the case of the two recent disasters, however, he 
complicates the temporality of models and simulations by showing how they 
enable scientists not only to foresee what will happen, but also to assess what 
has already happened. This temporal reversal – seeing prediction as about both 
the future and the past – is crucial to what I am emphasizing here.4 
]p1[That disasters are often understood through non-linear 
temporalities should come as no surprise to anthropologists, given the 
discipline’s long-standing interest in time (Bear 2014; Geertz 1973; Gell 1996; 
Greenhouse 1996; Munn 1992; Rabinow 2008). What may be more novel is 
the observation that temporality is explicitly political, such that the state’s 
authority is often predicated on specific arrangements of time. Referring to the 
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‘politics of temporality’ in the contemporary United States, Vincanne Adams, 
Michelle Murphy, and Adele Clarke argue that future-orientated regimes of 
anticipation increasingly define how ‘we think about, feel and address our 
contemporary problems’ (2009: 248). In their view, ‘anticipation is 
intensifying into a hegemonic formation’ that is motivating speculative logics 
of capital accumulation, spreading through our institutions of government, and 
becoming an affective state that orientates individual and collective behaviour. 
The sweeping phenomenon these scholars describe resonates throughout other 
works of social theory, which highlight the political implications of heightened 
anxiety about futurity and the subsequent proliferation of pre-emptive actions 
(Cooper 2006; 2010; Martin 2007; Massumi 2009; 2010).  
]p1[While much can be gained by theorizing temporal transformations 
on a grand scale, or what Daniel Rosenberg and Susan Harding refer to as the 
‘big stories of the future’ (2005: 14), they often lead to reductive denunciations 
of temporality as a domain of hegemony and domination.
5
 Once we 
acknowledge Koselleck’s irrefutable point that historical time ‘is bound up 
with social and political actions, with concretely acting and suffering human 
beings and their institutions and organizations’ (2004: 2; cf. 2002), then it 
logically follows that all forms of temporality are suffused with and 
constitutive of power (Greenhouse 1996). Yet while this ought to lead us to 
analyse futurity and its uneven effects on certain bodies, spaces, and 
populations, it would be a mistake to resort to automatic denunciations. For 
doing so would risk ascribing an almost totalizing quality to the politics of 
time, and leave us devoid of resources for thinking about the heterodox 
temporalities existing alongside and within dominant or hegemonic 
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formations.
6
 We need tools for analysing futurity as constitutive of both 
political authority and political possibility.
7
 
]p1[AbdouMaliq Simone’s (2010) understanding of ‘anticipatory urban 
politics’ is helpful in this regard.8 Among the urban poor in Northern Jakarta, 
Simone finds people ‘reading the anticipated manoeuvres of stronger actors 
and forces and assessing where there might be a useful opportunity to become 
an obstacle or facilitator for the aspirations of others’ (2010: 96).9 But the 
politics of anticipation is ‘not just a form of resistance or simply a politics 
from below’.10 Anticipatory politics constitutes a future-orientated ‘game of 
transactions’ that brings differently positioned urban actors into contact with 
each other, resulting in benefits and constraints for all (2010: 101). The future 
is neither the exclusive domain of state planners and economic elites nor that 
of popular political mobilizations – it is a horizon of strategic politics for 
diverse attempts to make and remake the city in the present. Since the city is 
‘not hinged, not anchored’ to any single trajectory, Simone urges us to 
remember that ‘by definition [it] goes toward many different futures at once’ 
(2010: 115). 
]p1[Simone’s reflections suggest that temporality is mapped on to 
certain spatial configurations, such that the city, we might say, is a key 
‘chronotope of modern time’ (Bakhtin 1981; Bear 2014). In cities, the future is 
alongside us, upon us, all around us. The past, of course, is present, too.
11
 But 
it is tempting to assume that (in some fundamental way) the city is orientated 
temporally towards horizons of possibility, expectations of change, and the 
anticipation of things to come. There is something misleading about this 
assumption, however, since it is rather peculiar to cities belonging to the 
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category of the ‘modern’. One of the defining characteristics of modernity was 
a belief in the progression of time towards a more efficient, more prosperous, 
and all-around better future; in turn, this promise hinged on the growth and 
development of cities and the domination of nature.
12
 The ‘modern city’ was 
considered the most advanced stage of social evolution, historical progress, 
and cultural development against which all other spatial forms were judged. 
And the destiny of places outside of Europe and North America was presumed 
to be a perpetual game of catch-up with Paris, London, and New York 
(Robinson 2004; Roy 2008). 
]p1[These imagined futures came into question in the late twentieth 
century as teleological, evolutionist, and developmental narratives of all kinds 
began to lose credibility (Ferguson 2006: 176-93). Today, it is more common 
to foresee futures of crisis, chaos, and catastrophe than to envision the 
emergence of ideal spaces and societies – conceptual resources for imagining 
alternative possibilities appear to be in short supply. Susan Buck-Morss (2000) 
famously attributed the ‘passing of mass utopia’, as she called it, to the 
exhaustion of the collective dreams of historical progress previously shared by 
East and West during the Cold War. With phrases like the ‘end of history’ 
(Fukuyama 1992), the ‘death of progress’ (Levitas 1982), the ‘post-
development era’ (Escobar 1992), and ‘living in the end times’ (Žižek 2010), 
others have made similarly epochal claims about the demise of the utopian 
imagination or of progressive thinking more broadly. These proclamations no 
doubt over-reach, and yet the weakening of grand narratives like 
‘modernization’ and ‘development’ has made way for a radically different 
future – one neither certain nor desirable, but rather filled with uncertainty and 
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marked by a rather grim sense of how history will unfold. Disaster, even 
apocalypse, looms large on the horizon.
13
 
]p1[The notion that we are now living ‘in the wake of utopia’, 
geographer David Pinder (2005: 12) points out, has greatly influenced 
dominant thinking about urban environments. In this context, inherited 
frameworks for urban planning and governance have been undergoing 
significant transformations as concepts like ‘preparedness’, ‘resilience’, and 
‘future-proofing’ have taken centre stage. Contemporary visions of urban 
environmental futurity share the sense that the city is a space of menacing 
uncertainty, imminent threat, and potential collapse. The logical response is the 
rationality of security underpinned by techniques for managing risks – of 
natural disaster and resource scarcity, but also of financial crisis, political 
violence, and disease outbreak. These techniques are multiple, as they have 
been assembled in order to govern different forms and degrees of uncertainty 
attached to diverse objects and events –predicting the likelihood of an 
earthquake can be altogether different from calculating the probability of a 
terrorist attack. Even when dealing with the same type of object or event, 
different actors (e.g. fluvial geomorphologists, people living in a floodplain, 
insurance companies) employ different modes of prediction that enable 
different sorts of claims and sets of responsibilities.  
]p1[As conventional assumptions about futurity are being thrown into 
doubt, we see something akin to what Rosenberg and Harding call the ‘crisis of 
modern futurity’ (2005a: 4), here in a specifically urban environmental form. 
Novel regimes of futurity are emerging in cities throughout the Global North 
and South, which generate new forms of political, legal, and ethical 
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responsibility tied to the imperative to predict and mitigate future catastrophes 
(cf. Laidlaw 2013).
14
 Prognosis then becomes a terrain on which citizens 
engage in political relationships with the state. This was true of the 2010-11 
flooding emergencies in Colombia, as well as of the 2009 earthquake in Italy. 
But while both events involved the state’s failure to foresee environmental 
futures, there is a difference between looking forward to potential disasters 
looming on the horizon and looking backward to ones that have already 
occurred. As we will see, risk in retrospect is a prognostic modality of 
environmental politics that sustains both political authority and critique. 
 
]ha[After the flood 
]p[From late 2010 to early 2012, Colombia was besieged by the worst rains on 
record. Unusually high levels of precipitation were attributed both to La Niña, 
or the cyclical cooling of the eastern Pacific Ocean that disrupts typical 
weather patterns, and to the increased severity of meteorological events 
associated with climate change. The resulting floods and landslides displaced 
hundreds of thousands of people, destroyed homes throughout the country, 
severely impacted the economy, and took the lives of several hundred citizens. 
Although rural areas in the north of the country and along the Caribbean coast 
were hardest hit, urban areas, such as a suburb of Colombia’s second largest 
city, Medellín, also witnessed grave tragedies. We could approach this 
situation by examining the models used to generate rainfall predictions and 
flood risk maps and their role in shaping the distribution of destruction and 
displacement. In temporal terms, our analytical position would then be both 
retrospective and prospective: looking back to the past to reveal the state’s 
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failure to prevent future disasters. Instead, I would like to draw attention to 
some of the conflicts that emerged during and after this period of flooding, 
which themselves revolved around both hindsight and foresight. Focusing on a 
specific flood event in the capital city, I will show how this temporal 
orientation was the ground for both political authority and critique. 
]p1[On Monday, 5 December 2011, Bogotá’s largest daily newspaper, 
El Tiempo, reported that, following a forty-eight-hour deluge, the Bogotá River 
was nearly overflowing its banks. Andrés González, the governor of 
Cundinamarca, the department that surrounds Bogotá, cautioned that water 
levels had risen sharply and could soon cause flooding downstream in the 
capital. These predictions came true the following afternoon. Another 
rainstorm developed, and the canals draining aguas negras (wastewater) from 
the city were blocked from conveying effluent to the Bogotá River, as they do 
under normal circumstances, owing to the river’s abnormally high level. 
Instead of discharging storm water and sewage, one of the drainage canals 
began to function as a reservoir, collecting wastewater and distributing it 
laterally across residential neighbourhoods in the peripheral locality of Bosa on 
Bogotá’s southwestern edge. Wastewater not only rushed through the streets, 
but also percolated up through sewers and drains, and within hours had risen to 
nearly a metre in height. Residents retreated to the second floor of their homes 
until rescue workers arrived with inflatable boats to transport them to dry land. 
Interim Mayor Clara López then declared an emergency and called on her staff 
to identify where to discharge the Bogotá River’s excess flow while pleading 
with bogotanos to limit water use immediately.
15
 These responses were 
effective though insufficient, and the municipal water utility appealed to 
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neighbouring countries to lend Bogotá a high-capacity pump used normally for 
petroleum extraction.
16
 Aided by a respite of dry, sunny weather, these 
measures eventually succeeded in reducing the river’s force and draining the 
inundated neighbourhoods. 
]p1[Mayor López then accompanied President Santos to El Recreo, one 
of the most heavily affected areas, to begin the provision of humanitarian aid. 
López had already agreed to provide tax relief as well as a rental subsidy of 
550,000 pesos (US$300) to those forced by the flooding to evacuate their 
homes.
17
 In addition, the municipal water utility had guaranteed fifteen days of 
free delivery.
18
 Donning a red ‘Colombia Humanitaria’ windbreaker, Santos 
announced that the national government would provide an additional 1.5 
million pesos (US$775) to each family adversely affected by the flooding.
19
 
The President estimated that more than 10,000 families would be eligible for 
aid, but said this was contingent upon an official census of the victims.
20
 The 
Secretary of Social Integration began compiling a registry by consulting the 
administrator of each residential housing complex and other community 
leaders. Bogotá’s disaster-risk-management agency (FOPAE) followed with 
house-by-house inspections to determine the extent of property damage and the 
number of people affected. Although preliminary estimates were as low as 
5,000 victims, FOPAE soon announced that the flooding had impacted over 
45,000 people in total.
21
 Once the official census was complete, the 
government issued a certificate of damages to each household, and the relief 
promised by López and Santos could be disbursed.
22
  
]p1[Long lines formed wherever aid was being handed out, and 
residents declared that there was not enough for the number of families in 
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need. Reports came back that there was no systematic process for allocating 
assistance; that food rations were being proportioned in an ad hoc manner.
23
 
Meanwhile, rumours circulated of people with false certificates arriving from 
elsewhere to steal from those in need. Others complained of flaws in the 
census, claiming they had been wrongfully excluded. For several hours, 
protesters blocked the Avenida Ciudad de Cali, a main thoroughfare in 
southwestern Bogotá, citing unreasonable delays in the distribution of aid.
24
 
Reporters from the news magazine Semana visited the flood zone in January 
and found the neighbourhood rife with accusations that the government had 
not made good on its promise to disburse subsidies by Christmas.
25
 In response 
to the pressure, the Secretary of Government ordered a review of the census, 
and FOPAE returned to verify their count. With media reports and popular 
protests denouncing the government’s response as disorganized and 
exclusionary, draining the city of flooding turned out to be less of a challenge 
than providing aid to the victims.  
]p1[The focus of public discontent soon shifted, however, as residents 
from the flooded neighbourhoods began blaming the authorities for having 
ignored the fact that the Bogotá River had overflowed its banks three times in 
recent years. They criticized the state for permitting development in high-risk 
zones and demanded accountability from the construction company that had 
knowingly built housing complexes in flood-prone areas.
26
 A group of 150 
protesters blocked a local transportation hub, Portal de las Américas, drawing 
attention to the fact that the flooding had predominantly inundated public 
housing. A resident framed the issue as follows: ‘These houses turned out to be 
a scam (el paquete chileno): [the state] promised us development (valorización 
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y vías) and we ended up living in a gutter’.27 Shared among these critiques was 
the sense that the state had failed to take the precautions necessary to protect 
people from a known threat. That is, the government should have foreseen the 
disaster and, if unable to prevent it, at least done more to mitigate its adverse 
effects. 
]p1[As those affected by the flooding were making their voices heard, 
similar perspectives circulated in the media. In the editorial page of El Tiempo, 
author and columnist Yolanda Reyes cited a history of irresponsible housing 
policy:  
 
]ex[I remember when Mayor Peñalosa invited ‘opinion leaders’ 
on a helicopter tour of the urban developments of 
Metrovivienda [social housing] in Bosa. Journalists admired the 
bicycle routes, the avenues, and the public spaces on the edge 
of what is now a sewer of aguas negras … Against logic, 
[Metrovivienda] developed these urbanizations with the 
promise that risk mitigation would happen later.
28
  
 
]p[Reyes also refuted President Santos’s constant references to La Niña by 
blaming the government for not having taken preventive measures and for 
ignoring past flooding experiences:  
 
]ex[[T]hey know that what happened in Bogotá is not new, that 
it is not simply the consequence of global climate change or the 
fault of ‘la maldita niña’, but rather of maldita improvisación 
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[damned improvisation]. If they consulted historical documents 
they would see that from Mosquera to San Victorino [a large 
area of western Bogotá], there have been times when those who 
were sold on the model homes in Bosa had to rely on the very 
same inflatable boats that are carrying them away today. 
 
]p[Emphasizing the error of uncontrolled growth of the urban periphery, Reyes 
asked: ‘Which public agencies approved those licences and allowed these 
developers to profit? Was there any fine print that warned about the probability 
of flooding?’ She concluded that protecting the urban poor from potential 
disasters is a central responsibility of the state. 
]p1[As Reyes’s op-ed makes clear, flooding in Bogotá was discussed 
publicly as more than just a problem of housing policy and land-use planning; 
issues of prognosis were front and centre. In an interview with Mayor López, 
El Tiempo asked explicitly whether the emergency in Bosa could have been 
prevented. ‘It was foreseen’, she admitted, ‘and this is why we built flood 
control channels, maintained the drainage systems, and dredged the Bogotá 
River’.29 Looking ahead to the future, the media also initiated discussions 
about how to ensure the same situation would not repeat itself during the next 
rainy season. In another op-ed, the chief editor of El Tiempo, Ernesto Cortés 
Fierro, argued that more anticipatory governance of ‘zones of high risk’ would 
be necessary: ‘[T]here are a million and a half souls sitting on the bank of the 
river in permanent danger, and rather than just asking ourselves what they are 
doing there, we have to respond to the question, what are we going to do about 
it?’30 A range of infrastructural solutions were considered, such as removing 
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the sediment and debris that impeded drainage through the system and 
widening the river to increase its conveyance capacity.
31
 When asked whether 
Bogotá was prepared for more rain, Secretary of Government Antonio Navarro 
Wolff assured the public that the administration would prioritize additional 
preventive measures so the same problems would not return in the future.
32
 
 
]ha[Hindsight and foresight 
]p[In January 2012, I visited the neighbourhoods that had been inundated by 
storm water and sewage one month before. I rode the TransMilenio mass 
transit system from central Bogotá to its southwestern terminus, the Portal de 
las Américas, which protesters had brought to a standstill in the days after the 
flooding. As I transferred to a bus that ran alongside one of the canals 
conveying wastewater to the outskirts of the city, I detected the stench of raw 
sewage still floating in the air. Debris lay stranded along its edges and hung 
from the bottom branches of squat trees lining its banks. I got off at a bakery 
and spoke to a waitress who confirmed that I was getting close to the site of the 
floods. The water level had risen a couple of feet in this part of the 
neighbourhood, she said, and the bakery had been forced to close for days. She 
then indicated how to get to the area that had been badly affected. ‘It’s pretty 
much all cleaned up by now’, she said, ‘but you’ll find people who are still 
angry. They knew something like this was going to happen, but nobody would 
listen’. 
]p1[Following her advice, I continued in the direction of the Bogotá 
River and found a number of residents willing to recount the story of the 
flooding. They told me about the panic they felt as the waters rose all around 
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them, the hardship of cleaning up and drying out, and the government’s 
dysfunctional response. But running through many of my conversations was 
also the sense that this was an event that could have been predicted, and 
therefore prevented. Mobilizing different forms of evidence – personal 
experience with past flooding events, periodic monitoring of water levels in the 
Bogotá River and the condition of adjacent drainage canals, the government’s 
own risk assessments and mitigation efforts – residents claimed that the 
flooding was the result of prognostic failure on the part of the state. 
]p1[The majority of the buildings I passed on my visit were vivienda de 
interés social (or social interest housing) constructed in the last ten to fifteen 
years. Although this was the urban periphery in a geographical sense – I could 
see where the pavement ended and the pasture began – it was no squatter 
settlement that had sprung up in a flood zone because people had nowhere else 
to live. These housing complexes had been officially planned and built with 
public funds. I stopped in a small convenience store operating out of the front 
room of a two-storey townhouse and began chatting with the woman behind 
the counter. When I asked about the flooding, she gestured to the point on her 
leg up to where the water had risen. ‘You’ve done a good job getting 
everything back into shape’, I remarked, noting the absence of visible damage. 
‘Yeah, but it hasn’t been easy. The government promised us three ayudas 
[disbursals of aid], but we have only received one’. She then told me that 
people in the neighbourhood were planning legal action against the state and 
the developer. ‘If you want to know more’, she offered, ‘you should talk to 
Doña Lucia, the president of the housing complex. She runs a supermercado 
on the next block’. 
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]p1[I did as she said, and found Doña Lucia in a shop similar to the one 
I had just visited, except that it stocked fresh fruits and vegetables and had a 
small refrigerator case for meat and dairy. At first, Doña Lucia seemed hesitant 
to talk about the flooding: ‘What exactly do you want to know?’ ‘I’m 
interested in the government’s response to the emergency’, I answered, ‘and 
how the people who live here feel about it’. This caught her attention, and she 
showed me the spot where President Santos addressed the residents of the 
neighbourhood, promising each victim a subsidy of 1.5 million pesos. ‘Ever 
since then’, she said shaking her head,  
 
]ex[there has been major disorganization on the part of the government 
in fulfilling its promises. Four days after Santos stood right outside my 
house, they came to conduct a census. This was necessary since there 
were lots of gente deshonesta [dishonest people] trying to pass 
themselves off as victims. But the census was completely disorganized. 
Some people were listed under the wrong identification number, others 
were excluded altogether, and this made it difficult for those who 
needed help to get it.  
 
]p[El desorden del estado, she called it. ‘The disorder of the state’. 
]p1[‘Is that what the protests have been about?’, I asked. Doña Lucia 
responded with an important clarification:  
 
]ex[Well, there were some people who tried to falsify their identity in 
order to get themselves counted by the census. They are not from here. 
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But those demonstrating in the Portal de la Américas were promised 
subsidies that never arrived. Many of the tomas [protests] have been 
organized by people whose houses had flooded.  
 
]p[I then asked whether these demonstrations had made a difference. ‘They 
came back to conduct another census’, she noted, ‘so I suppose we forced them 
to try to get it right. But there are still many people who deserve assistance and 
have not gotten any help. However, the main problem, as I see it, is that none 
of this should ever have happened in the first place’.  
]p1[Surprised by this abrupt change of direction, I asked Doña Lucia 
what she meant. She gave me the following explanation:  
 
]ex[We all knew this was going to happen. A group of us, maybe 
forty in total, got together back in September to call attention to the 
risk of flooding in the area and to denounce the government for not 
doing anything to prevent it. Look it up. It was on 8 September. 
City TV, Caracol, RCN, all the networks came to cover the story. 
We told them they had to clean out all the debris in the canals 
before the next heavy rain. Acueducto [the water utility] did a bit of 
clean-up, but in general the government just ignored us. And as a 
result, they were not prepared in December when the weather got 
really bad. We knew this was going to happen. They did too, but 
they didn’t do anything. They just waited, and then opened the 
floodgates once it was already too late. They have to be more 
prepared. The olas invernales [winter storms] are just going to get 
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stronger and stronger every year. We’re worried! The river is going 
to fill up again next time there are heavy rains. We’re always 
watching the sky. 
 
]p1[After our conversation, I did indeed look the story up, as Doña 
Lucia had instructed me to do. I started with the archive of El Tiempo, but 
found nothing indicating that residents from Bosa had made a denuncia 
(denunciation) back in September about the risk of flooding in their 
neighbourhood. I then looked through past editions of the other major Bogotá 
newspaper, El Espectador, and found nothing there either. I checked a few 
more media sources, but again came up empty. I was about to give up, 
concluding that Doña Lucia’s hindsight was 20/20, when I came across a 
posting on the RCN Television website from 9 December 2011 with the 
heading: ‘Flood in Bosa had been denounced three months ago’.33 Sure 
enough, what Doña Lucia had said was true. And since I could find no record 
of the protest until after the flooding had already occurred, it seemed that the 
warning had indeed fallen on deaf ears.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here. Caption: Disaster warning, 8 September 2011. Source: 
RCN Noticias.] 
 
]p1[The posting on the RCN website linked to a video clip that 
revealed a group of demonstrators gathered in front of television cameras on 
the morning of 8 September in Bosa (Fig. 1). Some were dressed formally in 
suit and tie while others were bundled up with scarves and hoods to ward off 
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the cold morning air. Men and women of all ages faced the cameras with 
expressions conveying seriousness and conviction. The newscaster explained 
that residents were worried that the area’s drainage system was inadequate to 
withstand the coming winter rains. Aided by handwritten signs, they warned of 
a potential threat that could lead to grave consequences, and asked the 
government to take immediate action (Fig. 2).  
 
]ex[Exigimos que la Alcaldía Distrital solucione el problema del 
río. ¡Evitemos una gran tragedia! We demand that City Hall solve 
the problem of the river. Let’s avoid a huge tragedy! 
 
]ex[El Consejo de Kasay de los Venados II presente… Ante el 
inminente riesgo de desbordamiento del río no queremos un 
gobierno distrital indiferente. The Administrative Council of Kasay 
de los Venados II [housing complex] is present … in light of the 
imminent risk of the river overflowing, we don’t want an 
indifferent city government. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 here. Caption: The imminent risk, 8 September 2011. 
Source: RCN Noticias.] 
 
]p[The microphone was passed to a middle-aged man, who took on the 
responsibility of speaking for the group:  
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]ex[Our worry is that we are staring in the face of an imminent 
flood (ante una inminente inundación) throughout the 
neighbourhood of El Recreo, and therefore we are making an 
urgent call to the Empresa Acueducto [water utility] to please 
dredge this river … this drainage canal … in an urgent manner. 
And we call not just on Acueducto but also on the municipal 
government to help us, because as soon as this area floods, all 
possible solutions are going to be unnecessary … they won’t do us 
any good at all.  
 
]p[Reflecting the peculiar temporality of environmental politics that I am  
calling risk in retrospect, the video clip then jumped ahead to footage of the 
December floods, driving home the point that these pleas were not heard and 
the residents of Bosa are now facing the consequences. 
 
]ha[Tragedies foretold 
]p[Like the debate surrounding the culpability of the Italian earthquake 
scientists, the case of flooding in Colombia involved not just the state’s 
responsibility to know and govern the future, but also its failure to have done 
so in the past. This type of situation has strong precedent in Colombia. A book 
by Gabriel García Márquez, Crónica de una muerte anunciada (1981), is a key 
cultural referent that has been used repeatedly, in Colombia and abroad, to give 
expression to tragedies that were foreseen but not avoided. Though not his 
most celebrated work, its circulation was boosted by the fact that García 
Márquez was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature the year after its 
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publication. An allegorical tale based on historical events that took place in the 
early 1950s in a sleepy town near the Caribbean coast, the novel is frequently 
referenced in ordinary conversation, but also by the media and politicians, to 
characterize undesirable occurrences that were anticipated but not averted. 
While it would be an exaggeration to say that the structure of Chronicle of a 
death foretold typifies a particularly Colombian understanding of temporality, 
it nevertheless helps explain the prognostic modality of environmental politics 
under examination here. And while this modality is not uncommon, García 
Márquez lent it both rhetorical form and moral authority such that it would 
become readily available as a frame for interpreting subsequent tragic events. 
]p1[The book tells the story of the murder of Santiago Nasar by the 
brothers of Angela Vicario, a woman whose virginity Santiago had supposedly 
taken. Angela’s husband discovers his bride’s lost innocence on the night of 
their wedding and immediately returns her to her family. Angela names 
Santiago as the culprit, and her brothers, butchers by trade, set out with knives 
to avenge their sister’s honour. Intoxicated from the previous night’s 
festivities, the Vicario brothers are not discreet about their objective. They are 
seen all over town sharpening their weapons, preparing their attack, even 
boasting about their plan to kill the man who has sullied Angela’s reputation. 
Nearly everyone knows what is going to happen, and yet no one intervenes to 
prevent the murder. There are different reasons for this: some townspeople 
doubt the sincerity of the Vicario brothers’ threats; others attempt 
unsuccessfully to warn the intended victim. In the end, Santiago is stabbed to 
death on the threshold of his family home. 
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]p1[The central problematic and temporal structure of this short work 
by the most recognized of modern Colombian authors parallel the prognostic 
modality of environmental politics described above. The narrator returns to the 
town many years after the murder, only to find evidence that everyone had 
known the killers’ intentions ahead of time and had been unable to stop them 
from accomplishing the deed. The tale recounts not the inability to foresee 
future events, but rather the failure to act appropriately on the knowledge 
available prior to their occurrence. It is both retrospective and prospective, 
looking backward to a moment in time in which an event was about to take 
place and forward in time from that moment to a future that was known. 
Neither the townspeople nor the authorities had stepped in to prevent the 
killing; the outcome was una muerte anunciada, a ‘death foretold’. 
]p1[Clearly referencing García Márquez’s prescient story, two 
catastrophic events that converged during one week in November 1985 were 
both seen, in their aftermath, as tragedias anunciadas (or ‘tragedies foretold’). 
On 6 November, thirty-five members of the M-19 guerrilla group attacked the 
Palace of Justice in central Bogotá taking hundreds of hostages, including 
twenty-four Supreme Court judges. President Belisario Betancur rejected their 
demand that he come and stand trial for accusations that he had betrayed a 
previously negotiated peace accord, and instead ordered the Army to storm the 
building. In the ensuing battle between the Colombian armed forces and the 
rebel gunmen, more than seventy-five hostages were killed, including eleven 
of the federal justices trapped inside. Exactly one week later, a volcano 80 
miles west of Bogotá, the Nevado del Ruiz, erupted suddenly and nearly 
30,000 people died as a massive mudslide buried the nearby town of Armero. 
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The media quickly assigned blame for the casualties in both cases to the 
government’s lack of foresight. Journalists demonstrated evidence showing 
that both events could have been anticipated and, therefore, prevented.
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 This 
sparked a crisis of political authority for which future-orientated security 
mechanisms were seen as the solution. From that moment on, the protection of 
human life against potential threats (both human and nonhuman in origin) 
would be an orientating telos of government: that is, a political rationality 
shaping the state’s authority over and responsibility to its subjects. The 
prognostic act of forecasting the outcome of similar situations in the future – 
according to scientific data on the probability of natural disasters or military 
intelligence on the likelihood of insurgent attacks – became a key dimension of 
political legitimacy. 
]p1[The catastrophic events of 1985 remain historical referents for 
contemporary understandings of political, legal, and ethical responsibility for 
the protection of human life in Colombia. My interviews in 2008 and 2009 
with state officials and policy experts on the subject of disaster risk 
management were filled with references to the siege of the Palace of Justice 
and the Armero disaster. A social scientist involved in the creation of risk-
management policy in Colombia referred to them as two of the most 
unforgettable events in recent memory. Like many of my other interlocutors, 
he pointed to them as central to the formation of political rationalities 
concerned with potential threats to collective life. The continued significance 
of these tragedies reflects how they were made to constitute a crisis in which 
the government’s inability to anticipate and avert them was seen as a 
monumental failure, and predictive, preventive, and pre-emptory techniques 
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were the solutions proposed.
35
 Although Colombians were more than familiar 
with both political violence and natural disaster prior to November 1985, it 
was at this moment that a new framework emerged through which such events 
would be understood and managed thereafter. 
]p1[This was not immediately clear to me when I began fieldwork in 
Bogotá on the politics of disaster risk. Although I sought to historicize what I 
saw as a constitutive relationship between foresight and political authority, 
legitimacy, and responsibility, at first it was difficult to engage my informants 
in this pursuit. There was an obviousness surrounding the topic that lent it an 
aura of inevitability: it seemed natural to expect that the state should be able to 
anticipate future threats and prevent them from materializing. When I asked 
people to consider what may have motivated such an expectation, they often 
returned to 1985. For my informants, this was the year of the ‘tragedies 
foretold’. These catastrophic events thereafter came to define the state’s 
responsibility to protect human life from future harm. 
 
]ha[Conclusion 
]p[I would like to conclude with a reflection on the prognostic modality of 
environmental politics highlighted by the Colombian and Italian cases by 
distinguishing between two somewhat different temporal orientations. In the 
first, an individual or group denounces the state for not being aware of, 
attentive to, or prepared for an event that has yet to take place. Back in 
September 2011, Doña Lucia and her neighbours looked to the future, 
identified a threat, organized prospective victims, demonstrated their 
vulnerability, and demanded pre-emptive action. The second temporal 
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orientation, which I am calling risk in retrospect, involves a critique aimed at 
political authorities and technical experts for not having been aware of, 
attentive to, or prepared for an event that eventually did occur. This critique is 
prospective in its reference to the state’s responsibility for potential threats. 
Yet it is also retrospective: protesters responding to the Bogotá floods and 
lawyers representing the L’Aquila earthquake victims both positioned 
themselves simultaneously in the aftermath of these events when their 
consequences were already known and prior to them when prevention could 
(or should) have been possible.
36
 They mobilized a combination of hindsight 
and foresight to demand accountability for the loss of life and livelihood. 
]p1[While the latter formulation differs from the previous one in its 
attempt to hold the state accountable for an actual event in the past, they share 
one key element: without calling into question the imperative to render the 
future governable in the present, those engaging in this prognostic modality of 
environmental politics demanded more and better mechanisms of prediction, 
prevention, and preparedness. And rather than disputing the fact that their 
status as political subjects was predicated on their vulnerability or victimhood, 
they sought to mobilize concern for an additional threat or to recognize a larger 
group of victims. Thus, while positioning themselves as critical of the state, 
they ultimately reinforced the future-orientated rationality of security – 
organized around the imperative to protect the life of the population against 
potential threats – as the basis of political authority and legitimacy. This raises 
questions about the transformative potential of prognosis in places, like 
Colombia, where security saturates the domain of politics and government. 
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]p1[These observations offer insight into the terrain of political 
engagement organized around environmental futures. They show that 
prognosis, while central to political authority, legitimacy, and responsibility, is 
also the ground upon which people formulate both demands on and critiques of 
the state. Although these claims, aspirations, and expectations may be 
constrained by the overarching logic of security within which they are situated, 
prognosis can be mobilized for a variety of political purposes. It is often 
deployed in order to draw attention to the state’s shortcomings, contradictions, 
and inadequacies by demonstrating the failure to provide protective care to its 
most vulnerable subjects in the face of potentially catastrophic events. Across 
the political spectrum, the key question is how prognosis is harnessed to 
specific political projects and to what effect. 
]p1[This is an important corrective to work that reduces the future to a 
domain of hegemony and domination and assumes a limited set of positions 
and possibilities. Temporality is not only a mechanism of social control 
through which to consolidate political authority, facilitate capital 
accumulation, and produce subjects amenable to both. In the cases I have 
described, prognosis is the ground upon which the state and critiques of it both 
rest. It is often within a prognostic domain, and not outside of or in opposition 
to it, that the poor demand more from their governments. And yet the 
transformative potential of prognosis as a domain of environmental politics is 
limited. Rather than calling into question, destabilizing, or taking hold of the 
state, the modality of prognosis I have analysed in Bogotá reinforces security 
as the orientating telos of government. Ultimately, while prospective 
denunciations take an oppositional stance vis-à-vis the state, they uphold the 
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established rationalities from which they derive their meaning and force as 
forms of popular political expression. 
]p1[I have brought together the L’Aquila earthquake and the Bogotá 
floods to demonstrate how prognosis becomes the basis of political 
engagement. But rather than revealing the ‘hidden’ politics of predictive 
techniques that are ostensibly objective, neutral, and scientific, my goal has 
been to highlight a modality of environmental politics in which future 
projections are explicitly central. And instead of showing how efforts to know 
and govern environmental futures shape the present, I have focused 
analytically on the problem of prognosis in the past. After all, concentrating 
exclusively on the future would risk mirroring the state’s fixation on the 
virtual, the potential, and the possible. In contrast, focusing methodologically 
on the past allows us to contextualize the tight connection between foresight 
and political authority and responsibility. As political legitimacy is 
increasingly tied to knowledge about the future – of resources, of disasters, and 
of many other objects and events – our ability to understand the politics of 
prognosis becomes ever more urgent. We need to reflect critically on the 
strategic potential of prognosis for those usually resigned to simply wait for 
something better (or worse!) to come along. 
 
]hx[NOTES 
My thanks go to Jessica Barnes for her tireless efforts in assembling this 
collection of essays, and to her and Andrew Matthews for editorial guidance. 
Two anonymous reviewers also commented generously and provided helpful 
suggestions. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2012 annual 
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meeting of the American Anthropological Association. In Bogotá, my 
gratitude goes to Laura Astrid Ramírez for her research assistance. The names 
of those quoted in the text were changed to protect their anonymity and all 
translations from the Spanish are my own. 
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6
 An inspiration for this analysis is Koselleck, who writes ‘not of one 
historical time, but rather of many forms of time superimposed on one another’ 
(2004: 2). 
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with the question: ‘What would it mean to not-anticipate?’ (2009: 260). 
Although their article seeks to imagine ‘strategies of refusal’ that disrupt 
anticipatory regimes, they nevertheless recognize that ‘perhaps a better tactic is 
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contribution to this volume. 
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 These anticipatory practices hinge on the recognition that dominant logics of 
capital accumulation and political rule are always fractured and inconclusive – 
as Simone argues, they are ‘full of potential holes capable of providing, albeit 
always temporarily, shelter and maneuverability’ (2010: 98). 
10
 After all, it is also through the promise of alternative futures that members of 
the urban poor come to believe that political change or economic development 
will eventually materialize, which limits their options and reduces their 
leverage. 
11
 For discussion of the relationship between past, present, and future, see 
Huyssen (2003), Koselleck (2004), and Luhmann (1998).  
12
 We are now aware that this idea was predicated on colonial assumptions 
about time and space, such that futurity mapped on to the spatial categories of 
centre/periphery and West/non-West. Geographical distance was equated with 
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 ‘Víctimas de invierno en Bosa y Kennedy viven drama para recibir ayudas’, 
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 For a discussion of the crisis de ‘gubernabilidad’ that ensued after the 
coincidence of the Armero tragedy and the attack on the Palace of Justice, see 
Ramírez Gomez & Cardona (1996: 267). 
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 To quote one of the lawyers for the victims’ families: ‘It’s not possible to 
predict an earthquake. But it was possible to predict the seismic risk in 
L’Aquila after months of tremors’. As such, this modality of prognostic 
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